Meta disclosed a WhatsApp vulnerability that allows attackers to compromise devices by sending malicious files to group chats—no user interaction required. The zero-click exploit was actively used by Paragon Solutions, an Israeli spyware vendor, to target journalists and civil society members.

Incident overview

AttributeDetails
Vulnerability typeZero-click remote code execution
Attack vectorMalicious PDF in group chat
Spyware deployedGraphite (Paragon Solutions)
Targets~90 individuals
Primary victimsJournalists, civil society, human rights groups
Geographic focusItaly (confirmed), broader scope suspected
DiscoveryUniversity of Toronto Citizen Lab
Fix typeServer-side (no client update required)

The attack chain

The vulnerability allows attackers to deliver malicious media files through WhatsApp group chats. Because WhatsApp automatically downloads media by default, the malicious payload reaches the victim’s device without any interaction.

PhaseAction
1Attacker identifies victim and one of their contacts
2Attacker creates new WhatsApp group
3Attacker adds victim and their contact to group
4Attacker promotes contact to admin (legitimizing group appearance)
5Attacker sends specially crafted PDF file
6WhatsApp auto-downloads file to victim’s device
7Graphite spyware executes without user interaction
8Spyware escapes Android sandbox, compromises other apps

Post-compromise capabilities

CapabilityAccess level
Encrypted messagesFull access
Call logsFull access
MicrophonePotential access
CameraPotential access
Other appsVia Android sandbox escape

Paragon Solutions and Graphite spyware

Paragon Solutions is an Israeli surveillance technology company competing with NSO Group in the commercial spyware market.

Company background

AttributeDetails
Founded2019
FoundersEhud Barak (former Israeli PM), Ehud Schneorson (ex-Unit 8200 commander)
ProductGraphite spyware
Market positionCompetes with NSO Group’s Pegasus
Claimed policySells only to democratic nations’ law enforcement/intelligence
AcquisitionDecember 2024, AE Industrial Partners ($500 million)

Known government clients

Citizen Lab mapped Paragon’s server infrastructure and identified potential government customers:

CountryStatus
AustraliaPotential client
CanadaPotential client
CyprusPotential client
DenmarkPotential client
IsraelPotential client
SingaporePotential client

US government use

AgencyStatusDetails
DEAConfirmed (2022)NY Times reported Graphite use
ICEConfirmed (2024)$2 million contract per Wired

Confirmed victims

IndividualRoleOrganization
Francesco CancellatoJournalistItalian media
Luca CasariniFounderMediterranea Saving Humans
Dr. Giuseppe CacciaFounderMediterranea Saving Humans

Forensic analysis confirmed Graphite spyware presence via the BIGPRETZEL forensic artifact unique to Paragon’s implant.

Targeting pattern

“In the cases already investigated, there is a troubling and familiar pattern of targeting human rights groups, government critics, and journalists.” — Citizen Lab

CVE-2025-55177

A related vulnerability addressed as part of the same attack chain:

AttributeDetails
CVECVE-2025-55177
CVSS5.4
Affected platformsWhatsApp for iOS, WhatsApp for macOS
TypeInsufficient authorization of linked device synchronization messages

Why group chats are effective attack vectors

FactorExploitation
Automatic media downloadDefault WhatsApp behavior downloads files without confirmation
Trust inheritanceGroups containing known contacts appear legitimate
Reduced scrutinyUsers pay less attention to files in group contexts
ScalabilityOne malicious file can target multiple users simultaneously
Social engineeringAdmin promotion makes group seem authentic

Telegram founder Pavel Durov cited the flaw as evidence that “WhatsApp has multiple attack vectors,” though Telegram has faced its own security scrutiny.

WhatsApp’s response

Immediate actions

ActionDetails
Server-side patchDeployed late 2024
User notificationFewer than 200 potentially targeted users notified
No CVE assignedWhatsApp chose not to request CVE-ID
Attack neutralizationDecember 2024

Why no client update?

WhatsApp addressed the vulnerability “without the need for a client-side fix”—the server-side patch eliminated the attack vector without requiring users to update their apps.

Ongoing improvements

InitiativeStatus
Enhanced protections for high-risk usersRolling out (journalists, activists, public figures first)
Broader availabilityPlanned for later 2026
Rust adoptionNew security components written in Rust for memory safety

Protection recommendations

For all WhatsApp users

PriorityAction
HighUpdate WhatsApp to latest version
HighDisable automatic media downloads
MediumReview group memberships regularly
MediumBe suspicious of unexpected group additions

Disabling automatic media downloads

Settings → Storage and Data → Media auto-download
Set all options to "No media"

For high-risk users (journalists, activists, executives)

ProtectionImplementation
WhatsApp advanced securityEnable when available
Silence Unknown CallersSettings → Privacy → Calls
Group privacy controlsSettings → Privacy → Groups (limit who can add you)
iOS Lockdown ModeDevice-level protection
Android hardeningDisable USB debugging, use work profile

Commercial spyware landscape

Major vendors

VendorProductNotable for
NSO GroupPegasusMost widely documented
Paragon SolutionsGraphiteThis campaign
CandiruDevilsTongueWindows/macOS focus
QuaDreamREIGNiOS zero-clicks
IntellexaPredatorEU-based operations
YearActionTarget
2019Lawsuit filedNSO Group (Pegasus attacks)
2024Court rulingNSO liable for hacking
OngoingMonitoringMultiple spyware vendors

Detection and forensics

Indicators of compromise

ArtifactPlatformMeaning
BIGPRETZELAndroidParagon Graphite confirmed
Unusual PDF processingBothPotential exploitation
Unexpected app permissionsBothPossible sandbox escape

What to do if targeted

StepAction
1Don’t factory reset immediately (preserves forensic evidence)
2Contact Citizen Lab or Amnesty Tech for analysis
3Consider legal consultation
4Document all suspicious activity
5After forensic preservation, consider new device

Recommendations

For individuals

PriorityAction
ImmediateUpdate all messaging apps
HighDisable automatic media downloads
HighReview group memberships
OngoingMaintain operational security awareness

For organizations with high-risk personnel

PriorityAction
HighImplement mobile device management
HighDeploy device-level hardening (Lockdown Mode)
HighEstablish incident response for spyware detection
OngoingMonitor threat intelligence on commercial spyware

Context

Zero-click exploits represent the most dangerous class of mobile vulnerabilities because they require no user action. The commercial spyware industry—companies like NSO Group, Paragon, and Candiru—develops and sells these exploits to governments, who use them for surveillance of journalists, dissidents, and political opponents.

WhatsApp has previously sued NSO Group over Pegasus spyware attacks and won a significant legal victory in 2024. The Paragon campaign demonstrates that the cat-and-mouse game between messaging platforms and surveillance vendors continues.

For users in sensitive roles, assume that sophisticated attackers may have access to undisclosed zero-click exploits. Defense in depth—updated software, restricted permissions, device hardening, and operational security practices—remains the best protection.