A Chinese state-sponsored hacking group designated Salt Typhoon conducted what US officials have called the “worst telecom hack in our nation’s history” throughout 2024, compromising at least nine major US telecommunications carriers and accessing sensitive wiretapping infrastructure used by law enforcement.

Scope of compromise

MetricImpact
Carriers breached9 confirmed (AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, Lumen, and others)
Users affectedMetadata accessed for 1+ million users
Geographic focusWashington D.C. area heavily targeted
High-value targetsPresidential campaign staff communications accessed
DurationMonths of undetected access

Confirmed victims

CarrierStatus
AT&TConfirmed breach, evicted December 2024
VerizonConfirmed breach, evicted December 2024
T-MobileConfirmed breach
Lumen TechnologiesConfirmed breach
Consolidated CommunicationsConfirmed breach
WindstreamConfirmed breach
Spectrum (Charter)Confirmed breach
Additional carriersUnder investigation

What was accessed

CALEA wiretapping systems

The most alarming aspect of the breach was Salt Typhoon’s access to systems implementing the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)—the infrastructure US carriers use to comply with court-ordered wiretaps.

Access typeImplication
Wiretap target listsKnowledge of who law enforcement is monitoring
Intercept capabilitiesPotential to eavesdrop on targets
Historical requestsUnderstanding of investigation priorities

Call detail records

Data typeDetails
Call metadataWho called whom, when, duration
Location dataCell tower records enabling geolocation
Text message metadataSMS routing information
VolumeOver 1 million users affected

Political targeting

Salt Typhoon accessed communications of individuals associated with both the Trump and Harris presidential campaigns during the 2024 election:

TargetAccess
Donald TrumpPhone communications
JD VancePhone communications
Harris campaign staffMultiple individuals

Attack methodology

Initial access

Salt Typhoon exploited vulnerabilities in internet-facing network equipment to gain initial footholds:

VectorDetails
Network appliancesExploited vulnerabilities in routers and switches
Zero-daysSome previously unknown vulnerabilities used
Credential theftCompromised administrator accounts

Custom malware

MalwareFunction
GhostSpiderBackdoor for persistent access
DemodexRootkit for stealth
SnappyBeeCredential harvesting
Additional toolsCustom implants for specific environments

Persistence

TechniqueDescription
Deep network accessCompromised core routing infrastructure
Multiple footholdsRedundant access paths
Legitimate credentialsUsed stolen admin accounts
Living off the landMinimized custom malware use

Attribution

US government assessment

AgencyAssessment
FBIHigh confidence: PRC state-sponsored
CISASalt Typhoon = Chinese MSS-affiliated
NSAConsistent with PRC cyber operations

Treasury sanctions

On January 17, 2025, the US Treasury Department sanctioned Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co., Ltd. for providing infrastructure support to Salt Typhoon operations.

FBI bounty

In April 2025, the FBI announced a $10 million reward for information leading to the identification or location of individuals behind Salt Typhoon.

Geopolitical context

Taiwan connection

Intelligence assessments indicate Salt Typhoon’s telecom targeting serves strategic objectives related to potential Taiwan Strait conflict:

ObjectivePurpose
Intelligence collectionUnderstanding US government communications
Pre-positioningEstablishing access for potential future disruption
Counter-intelligenceIdentifying surveillance targets

Comparison to Volt Typhoon

AspectSalt TyphoonVolt Typhoon
Primary targetsTelecommunicationsCritical infrastructure
Primary missionIntelligence collectionPre-positioning for disruption
SectorsTelecom carriers, ISPsWater, energy, transportation
Geographic focusCommunications infrastructureOperational technology

Both groups are assessed as Chinese state-sponsored but serve different strategic objectives.

Response and remediation

Carrier response

CarrierActions
AT&TEvicted Salt Typhoon December 2024, enhanced monitoring
VerizonEvicted December 2024, third-party verification
T-MobileInvestigation and remediation ongoing

Government response

ActionDetails
FBI/CISA joint investigationOngoing
Congressional briefingsMultiple classified sessions
SanctionsTreasury action against support infrastructure
CISA guidanceEnhanced security recommendations for telecoms

Legislative proposals

ProposalDescription
Enhanced telecom security requirementsMandatory security standards
CALEA modernizationUpdated wiretapping infrastructure requirements
Breach notificationFaster disclosure requirements
FundingIncreased cybersecurity investment

Encryption implications

The breach has reignited debate over encryption:

PerspectiveArgument
Security advocatesEnd-to-end encryption would have protected communications
Law enforcementEncryption complicates lawful access
Privacy groupsCentralized wiretap systems create attack surface
ActionBenefit
Use encrypted messaging (Signal, iMessage)Content protection
VPN usageAdditional traffic encryption
Assume SMS is not secureAvoid sensitive information via text

Ongoing concerns

Undetected access

US officials have indicated that additional compromises likely remain undiscovered:

ConcernStatus
Other carriersInvestigation ongoing
Duration of accessFull timeline unclear
Data exfiltrationFull scope unknown

FBI warning

The FBI has warned 200+ US organizations and 80 countries that they may have been targeted by Salt Typhoon operations.

Context

Salt Typhoon represents an unprecedented breach of US telecommunications infrastructure. The access to CALEA wiretapping systems is particularly significant—it means Chinese intelligence potentially gained visibility into who US law enforcement was monitoring and may have been able to conduct their own surveillance through the same infrastructure.

The breach highlights fundamental tensions in telecommunications security:

TensionChallenge
Lawful access vs. securityCALEA infrastructure creates attack surface
Speed vs. verificationReal-time communications hard to secure
Scale vs. monitoringMassive networks difficult to defend

For organizations and individuals, the primary lesson is that telecommunications metadata and unencrypted communications should be assumed vulnerable to sophisticated nation-state adversaries. End-to-end encrypted communications remain the most reliable protection against this class of threat.

The full impact of Salt Typhoon will likely take years to assess as investigations continue and additional compromises are discovered.